UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-24-2008

State v. Stone Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34571

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stone Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34571" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1678.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1678

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
FARON STONE,
)

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

NO. 34569

1

VS.

1

j
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

!

-1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 34

)

v.
FARON STONE,

i

Defendantdppellant.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WOODLAND, District Judge
HONORABLE N. RANDY SMITH, District Judge
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DENNIS BENJAMIN
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &
Bartlett, LLP
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334.4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAtUI,
FARON STONE,

COPY

)

1

Petitioner-Appellant,

)

NO. 34569

)
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
STATE OF IDAHO,

1
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 34571

)

i
)
i

FARON STONE,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WOODLAND, District Judge
HONORABLE N. RANDY SMITH, District Judge
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DENNIS BENJAMIN
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &
Bartlett, LLP
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ..............................................................................1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... 1
ISSUES............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 5
I.

II.

Stone Has Failed To Establish That The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying His
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea ........................................... 5
A.

Introduction......................................................................5

B.

Standard Of Review......................................................... 6

C.

Stone Has Failed To Show The District
Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying The
Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea Where
Stone Failed To Prove A Single Factual
Predicate For His Motion .................................................6

Stone Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Abused Its Sentencing Discretion.............................................10
A.

Introduction....................................................................I 0

B.

Standard Of Review .......................................................10

C.

Stone Has Failed To Show That The District
Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion ........................ 11

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING.......................................................................... 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Gabourie v. State. 125 Idaho 254. 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App . 1994)......................... 6
Griffith v . State. 121 Idaho 371. 825 P.2d 94 (Ct. App . 1992)...............................7
Mitchell v . State. 132 Idaho 274. 971 P.2d 727 (1998) ......................................... 6

.

State v. Bello. 135 Idaho 442. 19 P.3d 66 (Ct App. 2001) ................................. 11
State v. Carrasco. 117 Idaho 295. 787 P.2d 281 (1990) .......................................6
State v. Dopp. 124 Idaho 481. 861 P.2d 51 (1993) ...............................................7
State v. Farwell. 144 Idaho 732. 170 P.3d 397 (2007) .................................. 10. 11
State v . Johnson. 120 Idaho 408. 816 P.2d 364 (Ct. App . 1991).......................... 7
State v. Li. 131 Idaho 126. 952 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App . 1998)................................. 11
State v . Martinez. 89 Idaho 129. 403 P.2d 597 (1965).......................................... 6
State v . Mauro. 121 Idaho 178. 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ........................................... 7
State v . McFarland. 130 Idaho 358. 941 P.2d 330 (Ct. App . 1997) ..................6. 7
State v . Mitchell. 124 Idaho 374. 859 P.2d 972 (Ct. App . 1993) .........................13
State v . Oliver. 144 Idaho 722. 170 P.3d 387 (2007) .......................................... 11
State v . Rodriquez. 118 Idaho 957. 801 P.2d 1308 (Ct. App . 1990) .....................7
State v . Walker. 125 Idaho 11. 867 P.2d 244 (Ct. App . 1993) ............................ 12

.

State v . Ward. 135 Idaho 68. 14 P.3d 388 (Ct. App . 2000) ...............................6 7
RULES
I.C.R. 33(c) ........................................................................................................... 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Faron Stone appeals from his convictions and sentences for aggravated
battery on a law enforcement officer and unlawful possession of a firearm.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
Officers went to serve a no-knock search warrant at the residence
occupied by Stone and Maria Villa. (P.H. Tr., p. 7, L. 4 - p. 8, L. 10.') The basis
for judicial departure from the normal knock and announce requirement was
Stone's history of violence and evidence that he was armed with a ,357 Magnum
handgun and a . I 2 gauge shotgun. (P.H. Tr., p. 8, Ls. 11-24; p. 32, Ls. 1-24.)
The police planned to execute the warrant by having five officers go through the
front door using a noise flash distraction device and two officers go through the
back door and hold their positions, while another officer announced their
presence and that they were executing a search warrant. (P.H. Tr., p. 9, L. 1 - p.
14, L. 10.)
At about 1:30 in the morning the officers executed their plan. (P.H. Tr., p.
14, L. 9 -p. 16, L. 13; p. 60, L. 16- p. 61, L. 23; p. 79, L. 10 - p. 80, L. 12.) The
officers were wearing protective vests labeled "police," helmets and other
protective gear, and long sleeve shirts also marked "police." (P.H. Tr., p. 16, L.
15 - p. 17, L. 16; p. 61, L. 24 - p. 62, L. 4.) On the signal from the leading

' A copy of the preliminary hearing transcript is included in the record as an
exhibit. Because the line numbers do not exactly correspond with lines of text,
line numbers are approximate and based on the nearest number on the page.
1

officer, the police breached the front and back doors, used the noise flash
distraction device at the front, announced their presence and entered the
residence. (P.H. Tr., p. 17, L. 20-p. 19, L. 10; p. 20, L. 21 -p.24, L. 3; p. 62, L.
5 - p. 64, L. 14; p. 80, L. 13 - p. 81, L. 9.) As soon as the officers entered they
were fired upon, and returned fire. (P.H. Tr., p. 19, L. 10-12; p. 24, L. 4 - p. 25,
L. 25; p. 64, L. 3 - p. 65, L. 20; p. 81, L. 10

- p.

82, L. 19.) The officers

immediately retreated and called in additional officers to try and contain the
scene. (P.H. Tr., p. 19, L. 1 3 - p. 20, L. 20; p. 27, L. 10-p. 28, L. 3; p. 83, L. 16

- p. 85, L. 9.)

One of those additional officers arrived in his police vehicle with

his lights on, and was shot at once from the house. (P.H. Tr., p. 28, Ls. 4-22.)
Two officers were wounded. (P.H. Tr., p. 24, Ls. 13-21; p. 65, L. 5 - p. 67,
L. 18; p. 82, L. 3 - p. 83, L. 14.) Both of the officers were wounded by a ,357
caliber round, a caliber that none of the officers were armed with that night. (P.H.
Tr., p. 105, L. 3 - p. 119, L. 16.) In an interview after he was later apprehended,
Stone admitted having been present at the scene and firing the ,357 Magnum.
(P.H.Tr.,p. 125,L.3-p. 134,L.20.)
The state charged Stone with two counts of aggravated battery on a law
enforcement officer, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and one
count of unlawful possession of a firearm, with enhancements for use of a firearm
and being a persistent violator. (R., vol. 11, pp. 338-43.) The parties thereafter
entered into a plea agreement whereby Stone pled guilty to one count of
aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 476-89.) The court accepted the guilty

plea, and ordered the PSI prepared by July 7, 2006, and scheduled the
sentencing for July 13, 2006. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 484-86.)
The PSI was prepared on July 7, 2006. (PSI, p. I.) On July 13, 2006, for
reasons that do not appear in the record, the district court continued the
sentencing to August 17, 2006. (R., vol. I, ROA.) On August 2, 2006, Stone
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 490-91.)

The specific

grounds for the motion were that Stone claimed he did not understand that the
prosecutor's recommendations were not binding on the court, and that he had
been given only 48 hours to consider whether to take the plea agreement and felt
pressured to take the plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 492-93.)
New counsel, appointed to represent Stone after the initial motion to
withdraw his plea, filed a second motion to withdraw the guilty plea alleging
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) The
district court denied the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced Stone to
consecutive terms of twenty five years with twenty years fixed for aggravated
battery on a law enforcement officer and five years fixed for unlawful possession
of a firearm. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 522-26.) Stone appealed after having his appeal
rights restored through post conviction proceedings. (R., vol. I, pp. 110-16.)

ISSUES
Stone states the issues on appeal as:
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying the
incorrect legal standard to the motion to withdraw the guilty
pleas?

B. Did the District Court err in finding that Mr. Stone's guilty pleas
were knowing and voluntary given that they were entered
without knowledge of the defenses being waived?
C. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea given that Mr. Stone had demonstrated just cause to
grant the motion, his motivation for the motion was not simply to
avoid a negative presentence report but rather to withdraw
pleas entered in ignorance of several viable defenses, and
there was no allegation that the State would be prejudiced by
withdrawal?
D. Did the District Court err in imposing an excessive sentence?
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Stone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the factual claims
Stone made in support of his motion were either completely unsupported
by evidence or were affirmatively belied by the record?

2.

Has Stone failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.
Stone Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denyin0 His Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Plea
A.

Introduction
Stone moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 490-91.) He

supported his motion with an affidavit claiming he did not understand that the
prosecutor's recommendations were not binding on the court, and that he had
only 48 hours to consider whether to take the plea agreement and felt pressured
to take the plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 492-93.) He, through new counsel, also filed a
second motion to withdraw the plea asserting several claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) Stone never supported this
motion with any evidence whatsoever. (See ~enerally,R.; 10/19/06 Tr.)
At the hearing the district court concluded that ail of Stone's factual
allegations were disproved by the record, and on that basis denied the motion.
(10/19/06 Tr., p. 22, L. 3 - p. 34, L. 23.)
Stone argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.) Specifically,
Stone contends the district court applied an incorrect legal standard (Appellant's
brief, pp. 15-17); found incorrect facts (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-20); and failed to
consider his claimed proper motivation in making the motion (Appellant's brief,
pp. 20-23). Because Stone failed to establish in the district court a single factual
premise for his motion, his argument has no merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellant seeking reversal of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty

plea must demonstrate an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 89 ldaho 129,
138, 403 P.2d 597, 603 (1965). Where the district court conducts a hearing and
enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho
274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998); Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254,
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is limited to whether the district court exercised sound
judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Ward, 135
ldaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. McFarland, 130 ldaho
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the decision to grant or
deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court).
C.

Stone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denvina The Motion To Withdraw The Guiltv Plea Where Stone Failed To
Prove A Sinale Factual Predicate For His Motion
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which

provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or
imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. State v.
Carrasco, 117 ldaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). The defendant bears

the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.
Griffith v. State, 121 ldaho 371, 374-75, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992).
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109,
111 (1991); State v. Rodrisuez, 118 ldaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct.
App. 1990). If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court
must determine whether other reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw
the plea.

When a motion is made prior to sentencing, the defendant must

present a just reason for withdrawing the plea. State v. McFarland, 130 ldaho
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 1997). The decision to grant or deny a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court.

Id.

However, where, as here, the defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before
the imposition of sentence "but after [he] has read his presentence report or
received other information about his probable sentence, the court is to exercise
broad discretion, but may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's
apparent motive." State v. Johnson, 120 ldaho 408, 41 1, 816 P.2d 364, 366 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citation omitted). The failure of a defendant to present and support a
plausible reason for withdrawal, even in the absence of prejudice to the state, will
dictate against granting the motion. State v. Ward, 135 ldaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d
388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Dopp, 124 ldaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51,
55 (1993); McFarland, 130 ldaho at 362, 941 P.2d at 334).

Stone failed to prove a single factual predicate of his motion.

He

presented no evidence supporting his claims that prior counsel was ineffective in
relation to his guilty plea.

(R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) The only evidence he

presented was an unsworn "affidavit." That affidavit asserts the following:
[At sentencing,] I was under the impression the Judge could
not go higher that [the] 7112 plus 7112 year sentence that the
prosecutor and the attorney agreed to. It was after I plead guilty
that I understood [the] judge was not bound by it. Even though my
attorneys told me that the hearing made it seem like I understood
that the Judge wasn't bound. I thought the guilty plea could be
withdrawn if he wanted to go higher than the 7112 plus 7112. 1 did
not understand [that] the legal implications of the hearing were
specifically designed to not allow me to take back my plea.
Besides, I only had 48 hours to make this decision which
was not enough time to make. I felt very pressured to take the
plea. My attorneys told me that the 7112 plus 7112 was the longest I
[would] have to do. This information was false. I feel that they
weren't totally forthcoming with all the information I needed to make
an informed decision.
(R., vol. Ill, p. 492 (brackets and grammar original).)
The claim that he thought the state's recommendation was binding on the
court is directly belied by the record. In the plea questionnaire Stone specifically
acknowledged that the maximum sentences he faced were, respectively, 25
years and five years. (R., vol. Ill, p. 479.) He acknowledged understanding that
the only person who could promise what sentence he could actually receive was
the judge, and that "the judge is not required to follow the sentence
recommendation by either [Stone's] attorney or the prosecutor." (R., vol. Ill, p.
481.) The plea agreement he signed and filed was entitled "NON BINDING
PLEA AGREEMENT."

(R., vol. Ill, p. 487 (capitalization original).)

It also

specifically stated, right above Stone's signature, that the parties "AGREED and

understood that the Plea Agreement is NOT binding on the Court." (R., vol. Ill, p.
489 (emphasis original).) Before accepting the plea the court made sure Stone
knew he was facing sentences of up to 25 and 5 years, and could go to prison for
30 years. (5123106 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 2-23.) The judge specifically informed Stone that
he had previously informed the parties that he would not accept a binding plea
agreement, and Stone stated he understood. (5123106 Tr., p. 3, L. 5 - p. 7, L.
12.)
Likewise, Stone's claim that he did not have enough time and was
pressured into pleading is also belied by the record. In the plea questionnaire
Stone stated he had fully discussed the case with his counsel and was satisfied
with his representation. (R., vol. Ill, p. 479.) He acknowledged that there were
no threats or anything else to make him enter a plea against his will. (R., vol. Ill,
p. 480.) He admitted the truth of the charges and waived his rights. (R., vol. Ill,
pp. 480, 482.) He specifically stated it was his desire to enter a guilty plea. (R.,
vol. Ill, p. 483.) At the plea colloquy Stone stated that the only problem he had
with his attorney was the attorney's propensity to tell "bad jokes." (5123106 Tr., p.
8, L. 8 - p. 9, L. 5.) He stated he had enough time to talk with his counsel and
that there was nothing further he wished to discuss with them. (5123106 Tr., p. 9,
L. 6 - p. 10, L. 12.) He stated that no one was forcing him or threatening him to
get him to plead guilty. (5123106 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 16-22.) The court specifically told
Stone that it would "rather you not plead and go to trial than to accept something
you don't want." (5123106 Tr., p. 14, L. 25

- p.

15, L. 2.) Stone stated he

understood, and still wanted to go through with the guilty plea. (5123106 Tr., p.
15, Ls. 3-5.)
Stone failed to support any of the claims in his motions to withdraw his
guilty plea with any evidence.

Even accepting his unsworn "affidavit" as

evidence, all of the relevant allegations in it are clearly belied by the record.
Because Stone failed to show a single factual predicate of his motion to
withdraw, he failed to present any reason, much less a just one, for withdrawing
his plea. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
II.
Stone Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court sentenced Stone to twenty five years with twenty fixed

for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and five years fixed for
unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served consecutively. (R., vol. Ill, pp.
522-26.) Stone argues that this sentence should be considered a fixed life
sentence, and that a fixed life sentence is excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2326.) Stone's argument that his sentence is the legal equivalent of a fixed life
sentence is baseless. He has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d

397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.
C.

Id.

Stone Has Failed To Show That His Sentences Constitute An Abuse Of
Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
Stone argues that his sentences amount to a fixed life sentence.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) This argument is without legal or factual merit.
Although especially lengthy fixed sentences have been deemed fixed life
sentences for purposes of appellate review, in the cases cited by Stone the fixed
portion of the sentences were, respectively, 80 years, State v. Bello, 135 ldaho
442, 444, 19 P.3d 66, 68 (Ct. App. 2001), and 65 years, State v. Li, 131 ldaho
126, 128,952 P.2d 1262,1264 (Ct. App. 1998). By comparison, the ldaho Court
of Appeals rejected a claim that a sentence of 25 years with fifteen fixed was the

equivalent of a fixed life sentence where the defendant suffered from a terminal
illness making it very likely that he would die before being eligible for parole.
State v. Walker, 125 Idaho 11, 867 P.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, it appears
from the cases that a fixed sentence must be very long before it is deemed a
fixed life sentence for purposes of appellate review, and that individual
circumstances making death before release likely, such as Walker's terminal
illness, do not suffice to deem a sentence the equivalent of a fixed life sentence.
In this case Stone argues that because he is a Native American, and 42
years of age, he will probably die before he serves the 25-year fixed portion of
his sentences. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.) Stone's circumstances, even if
accepted as true, are much more like Walker's (where the sentence was not
deemed equivalent to fixed life) than Bello's or Li's (whose sentences were
deemed equivalent to fixed life). First, his sentence is much shorter, 25 years
fixed as opposed to 65 or more years fixed. Second, the primary reason he
believes he is entitled to a closer scrutiny of his sentence is his belief that he will
not live to be paroled; but his concern is more like Walker's in this regard also Walker had a terminal illness, while Stone is a member of an allegedly short lived
ethnic group. Because the legal standard of deeming a sentence the equivalent
of fixed life for purposes of appellate review appears applicable only to
extraordinarily lengthy sentences, not merely circumstances where death before
parole is likely, Stone's arguments are without legal merit.
Even if Stone's arguments had legal merit, they lack factual merit. Stone
presented no evidence of what his likely lifespan would be to the district court.

On appeal he requests this Court to consider actuarial information about Native
Americans. His request that this Court consider evidence not presented to the
district court is improper, however. State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859
P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court. We are limited to
review of the record made below.") (and cases cited).
Even if it were proper for this Court to consider the evidence cited by
Stone, it does not support his claim. The evidence actually shows that Native
Americans have low life expectancy, in great part, because of very high infant
mortality. Because Stone has clearly survived his infancy, the information cited
has little predictive value for him. Likewise, Stone's assumption that he will be
stressed, lack good nutrition, have inadequate medical care, and be exposed to
life threatening diseases in prison (Appellant's brief, p. 25) is false and
unsupported by anything but the wildest speculation. It is clear, however, that
incarceration will likely eliminate at least three activities that could shorten
Stone's life: drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and shootouts with police. In short,
Stone's belief that he will die before he is paroled is without factual merit and
based entirely upon speculation.
In sentencing the district court specifically considered the four goals of
sentencing, and indicated it was not sentencing to impose punishment for
punishment's sake. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 71, L. 22 - p. 72, L. 17.) The court relied
heavily on Stone's extensive record, especially his extensive history of violent
felonies.

(10119/06 Tr., p. 73, Ls. 14-25; p. 75, Ls. 7-16;

see

PSI, pp. 5-15

(multitudinous prior juvenile and criminal convictions, including felony convictions
for aggravated battery, attempted robbery, and kidnapping).) The court stated
that giving a sentence less than had been imposed for prior violent felonies
would severely undermine the goal of deterrence. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 1-14;
see PSI, pp. 9-15 (prior sentences of 15 and 10.5 years).)
-

The court concluded

that protection of society and deterrence would justify fixing the maximum
sentences in this case, but that in the interests of rehabilitation some
indeterminate time was appropriate. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 75, L. 17 - p. 76, L. 16.)
The district court's rationale is reasonable on the facts before it. Stone
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's sentences.
CONCLUSION
The state requests this Court to affirm Stone's convictions and sentences.
DATED this ~ 4day
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24'h day of September 2008 1 caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
P.O. BOX 2772
BOISE, ID 83701

